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 Abstract:  
 
Purpose: We examine the mechanism of intercorporate lending outside the business group, 
and a reaction of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and capital engagement in other firms to 
shocks in the provision of such loans. We diagnose the causes and effects of intercorporate 
lending outside the business group.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: We use panel data from annual reports (balance sheets and 
income statements) of 4,600 private Polish companies that provided loans to other firms in 
the period 2003-2014. We apply the vector autoregression panel model for microeconomic 
data and analysis of Granger causality, impulse response functions, and forecast error 
variation decomposition to explore the mechanism of intercorporate loan provision.  
Findings: Non-financial firms provide loans outside the business group through 
redistribution of their cash holdings generated from operating activity (cash flow) and long-
term bank loans. The provision of loans by non-financial enterprises decreases CAPEX, as a 
result of the absence of free cash flows that were already used for loan provision. 
Shareholder loans substitute for capital engagement in other firms. 
Practical Implications: The findings could assist policymakers to notice that emergency 
borrowings from other companies are being used to defer defaults and introduce a new 
credit risk into the business sector.    
Originality/Value: The redistribution effect of cash holdings and money borrowed from 
banks provided to unrelated firms outside the business group is dangerous for the stability of 
the financial system due to the risk that these “indirect borrowers” will default. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The core aim of this paper is to better understand the mechanism underlying “arms 
length” intercorporate lending practices between private firms (i.e. private non-
financial enterprises providing loans to companies from outside their business 
group). Related to this, an important purpose is to diagnose the causes and effects of 
lending by non-financial companies to unrelated firms. Further, within this setting, 
we are keen to examine the reaction of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and capital 
engagement (i.e. investment in the shares of other companies) to shocks in the 
provision of loans.  
 
We choose Poland as our setting and the empirical advantage gained from this 
choice derives from several considerations. First, in Poland, the non-financial 
corporate debt-to-GDP ratio is one of the lowest in Europe at 42%, while this ratio is 
74% in the UK, 165% in Sweden and 189% in Ireland (Dobbs et al., 2015). Second, 
the usage of limited liability companies as a tax avoidance mechanism for lending 
money by partnerships or individuals to their partnerships. This is more important, 
because such partnerships constitute over 90% of Poland’s business sector. Third, 
the unwillingness of equity holders to contribute funds to the firm in the form of 
equity that is irreclaimable (paid once without any possibility of reimbursement 
before the firm's liquidation) is crucial in the case of Poland. Fourth, the inside-debt 
concept of financing firms by loans granted by their owners (individuals). Seppa 
(2010; 2014) analyzed the demand side of inside-debt in Estonia, while our research 
focuses on the supply side of intercorporate lending outside the business group. 
Previously, for 314 small Estonian firms, in 2007, Seppa (2014) showed positive 
inside-debt-bankruptcy relations. While inside-debt carries no risk elements per se, 
his findings indicate that the use of inside-debt has significant power to signal an 
increasing bankruptcy risk.  
 
Our findings show that non-financial firms provide loans outside their business 
group through the redistribution of their cash holdings generated from operating 
activity (cash flow) and long-term bank loans. Intercorporate loans outside the 
business group are provided by viable companies with low equity investment in 
other firms inside the business group. The provisions of such loans are financed by 
bank debt and trade credit outside the business group.  
 
Financing the enterprise with trade credit or borrowings from other companies is 
especially important in the case of firms from developing countries where legal 
systems are weak. Loans granted among enterprises are less vulnerable to credit 
rationing and, at the same time, enhance the growth of emerging countries, such as 
China (He, Lu and Ongena, 2016). Unfortunately, to date, the lack of direct data 
concerning borrowings from non-financial companies has severely constrained the 
literature’s ability to deliver knowledge on intercorporate lending among enterprises 
and the lending activity conducted by non-financial enterprises. Generally, such 
borrowings are reported on the liabilities-side together with bank loans. Small and 
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medium enterprises (SMEs) encounter considerable barriers in obtaining a bank 
loan, which encourages them to finance themselves with loans obtained from 
shareholders or other enterprises (from outside the business group), e.g. to avoid the 
limitations associated with thin capitalization, in terms of interest tax shield. 
Because a lending enterprise controls and monitors a borrower, especially if the 
lender is a supplier, even though the lender takes the credit risk, they have an 
advantage over financial institutions in terms of information asymmetry. More 
specifically, this advantage occurs because such a lender has higher access to 
information and can execute their receivables from their clients more efficiently.  
 
The theoretical literature provides evidence that managers could use excess cash to 
grant loans, taking into account a corporate financial policy motive in the case of 
poor investment opportunities for the lender, when the lender lacks viable projects 
and extends loans because of their lack of alternatives. Moreover, Arnold (2014) 
supposes that the use of managerial cash for granting a loan is a buffer against the 
borrower’s bankruptcy during difficult times, instead of contributing funds to their 
equity.  
 
In the Polish case, the tax avoidance motive together with the use of a limited 
liability company as a broker (agent) in transferring money from individuals to 
partnerships, is also crucial and recommended by tax advisors. There are two 
opposing sides of this tax avoidance motive. On the one hand, according to the 
corporate income tax law, thin capitalization encourages related companies to find 
other ways to lend money to subsidiaries to avoid the higher taxation resulting from 
the non-tax-deductibility of interest and fees paid (when exceeding credit limits 
under the thin capitalization rules inside the business group). On the other hand, 
under the natural person income tax law, tax avoidance of the lender’s (which is not 
a legal person but a natural person (an individual or a partnership)) income from 
interest gained on loans provided outside the business group is possible via the use 
of a limited liability company as a financial intermediary (agent). Restrictions on 
partnerships and partners of partnerships that lend money to partnerships are 
connected with double taxation under the personal income tax law. Moreover, the 
provision of loans by non-financial companies results in obligations relating to VAT 
tax or tax on civil law transactions. 
 
Our paper contributes to existing literature on financial flexibility and cash holdings 
by closing the gap in the identification of the redistribution effect of cash holdings 
and money borrowed from banks in intercorporate lending outside the business 
group. This phenomenon of non-financial companies “stepping into the shoes” of 
banks is dangerous for the stability of the financial system due to the risk that these 
“indirect borrowers” will default. Our findings indicate that intercorporate lending 
decreases CAPEX as a result of the absence of free cash flows that were already 
used for the loan provision. Moreover, shareholder loans substitute for capital 
engagement in other firms. The results allow policymakers to notice that emergency 
borrowings from other companies used to defer defaults, introduce a new credit risk 
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into the business sector resulting not only in underinvestment, but also in liquidity 
problems and an increase in financial constraints.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Differences between Non-bank Borrowings and Bank Loans 
 
In countries like Poland, which while subject to a Civil Code, have no major 
restrictions for non-financial companies and other entities (including individuals) on 
funding others in the form of non-bank borrowings. However, non-financial firms 
are legally restricted in their ability to, de facto, act as banks. Therefore, it is 
important to learn, in our chosen context of Poland, what are the differences between 
non-bank borrowings and bank loans? 
 
The loan (non-bank borrowings) agreement is governed by the provisions of art. 
720-724 of the Civil Code. Via a loan agreement, the lender is obliged to transfer to 
the ownership of a receiver a certain amount of money and the receiver undertakes 
to pay back the same amount of money. The necessary element of a loan agreement 
is not, therefore, the lender’s earnings (e.g. interest) in return for providing a non-
bank loan. The key feature of such a loan, in the terms of the Civil Code, is that it is 
free of charge. Of course, the contract between the parties is very likely to be 
different. It can take into account an interest fee, in accordance with the 
requirements of tax law. The interest which is not received from the free-of-charge 
borrowing is taxable revenue, under corporate income tax law in Poland. However, 
when the Polish income tax law is taken into account, lenders should earn interest 
revenue based on a market price or on the arm’s length principle that assumes that 
the parties to a transaction are independent and on an equal footing.  
 
The partner (shareholder) of a limited liability company can lend money to the 
company for various purposes. The necessary terms of the non-bank loan agreement 
(unlike the bank loan agreement) do not indicate how to use the funding from the 
loan. However, it is permitted that a provision of the contract obliges the borrower to 
use the loan funding in a specific way – a likely scenario, when the non-bank loan is 
provided by a shareholder interested in the development of the company. 
 
2.2 Literature Review on Intercorporate Lending and Hypotheses Development 
 
Based on literature review, even if the non-financial firms which provide loans have 
poor investment opportunities, it is not clear that making intra-group loans is 
socially efficient and justified. The main reason for this view is that there is a risk of 
the expropriation of minority shareholders in pyramids (this behavior is called 
tunneling) (Buchuk et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2000). The minority shareholders of 
those firms can prefer an increase in dividends rather than using such lenders’ cash 
flow to provide loans to other firms, especially outside the business group. Intra-
group loans can also be socially inefficient, even if they are privately efficient 
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because, by retaining earnings, business groups can make it harder for standalone 
firms to access finance (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). Moreover, there could be a 
fall in profits or return on equity because, in the case of lending money outside a 
firm or a group, good projects might be left unfunded (Buchuk et al., 2014). Thus, 
our research intends to test the following hypothesis: 
  
H1: The provision of loans by non-financial companies is negatively associated with 
the amount of capital expenditure. 
 
 In the literature and findings of the SAFE (2013; 2016) surveys, it is well 
documented that a considerable proportion of the funding to micro and small firms is 
provided by their owners (Yilmazer and Schrank, 2006; Seppa 2010; Coleman and 
Robb, 2009; Casey and O’Toole, 2014). This funding, known as “inside-debt”, is 
debt provided by principal owners or households as an alternative capital source to 
straight equity capital. Inside-debt often does not carry any regular amortization 
plan. Repayments are made when the firm has sufficient cash available or never.  
 
Therefore, the effect of inside-debt repayments is similar to dividend payments. 
Indeed, bank loan providers consider inside-debt as quasi-equity, such that 
conventional equity is adjusted for inside-debt (adjusted equity = book equity + 
inside-debt). Seppa (2014) found that inside-debt is significantly and positively 
related to financial leverage. Therefore, we state the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: The provision of loans by non-financial companies decreases capital 
engagement, i.e. there is a substitution effect in financing an enterprise through 
contributions to cover capital via loans from shareholders. 
 
Moreover, the literature provides evidence for the occurrence of the “redistribution” 
effect through a trade credit channel. According to the redistribution view, 
companies accumulate cash holdings in periods of loose monetary policy and then, 
in times of more stringent bank credit constraints, pass on the “liquidity benefits” of 
their cash holdings in the form of trade credit. As a result, large companies could use 
trade credit as an alternative to discount policies to ensure sales growth (Meltzer, 
1960). Firms with better access to bank financing offer more trade credit, which 
means that they may act as intermediaries between institutional lenders and firms 
with limited access to bank loans. Short-term bank loans are used for minimising 
transaction costs. In periods of restrictive monetary policy, buyers facing bank 
funding constraints increase their demand for trade credit much more than those who 
do not experience credit rationing; thereby reflecting the existence of a strong 
monetary policy transmission channel (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).  
 
Trade credit is a channel through which financing is redistributed between firms and 
credit is relocated from sellers who enjoy access to bank financing, towards buyers 
whose access to bank financing is limited (Guariglia and Mateut, 2006, Taketa and 
Udell, 2007). Profitable firms lend some part of their bank loan via trade credit to 
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support their business partners, but the size of this credit decreases as the availability 
of bank loans grows (Cull and Morduch, 2007). Disturbances in the redistribution 
mechanism transmitted via trade credit are caused by the worsening financial 
standing (as a result of the crisis) of traditional providers of this type of credit, i.e., 
firms with a higher level of short-term debt (Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 2007).  
 Trade credit is found to have a positive impact on the real output, the counter-
cyclical pattern of the substitution effect being the spontaneous relaxation of 
constraints imposed by financial institutions in periods of economic stagnation and 
is a self-triggering mechanism smoothing liberal crediting policies during periods of 
rapid growth (Huang, Shi and Zhang, 2011). We extend this concept to lending 
money to other companies with the use of loans (the real transfer of money) instead 
of trade credit (simply postponing repayment). Our hypothesis becomes: 
  
H3: There is a redistribution effect of cash holdings with the use of loans provided 
to other firms outside the business group. 
 
As far as we can establish, banks are not greatly aware of the nature or extent of 
lending by their borrowers to their affiliates (related companies) or other entities 
(unrelated companies). However, banks are aware of the financing potential of 
borrowers by way of loans received from their shareholders. Banks respond to this 
inside debt occurrence by requiring the signing of a subordinate clause that prevents 
the repayment of such loans before the settlement of a bank loan. This allows banks 
to treat these loans from the shareholders as quasi-equity, thereby improving debt 
ratios (Seppa, 2014). 
 
Intra-group and inter-corporate loans (within business groups and also between 
unrelated firms) can be used for redirecting cash from surplus to deficit situations 
across firms. Almeida et al. (2011) show that groups use internal revenues as funds 
to set up or acquire capital-intensive firms, which are more likely to be constrained 
in financial markets (Belenzon, Berkovitz and Rios, 2013). Similarly, Gopalan, 
Nanda and Seru (2014) find that CAPEX is partly financed by dividends received 
from other firms inside the business group. 
 
3. Data  
 
We identify 4,600 lenders among 30,000 private non-financial firms based on data 
of financial assets retrieved from the Bisnode database. Bisnode recognizes positive 
amounts of receivables from loans provided to related entities (inside a business 
group) separately from those provided to unrelated entities (outside the business 
group), at the balance sheet date. We retrieve data (with positive values) for the 
following items: long-term investments, including receivables of long-term loans 
from related and unrelated companies (separately), and short-term investments, 
including receivables of short-term loans from related and unrelated companies 
(separately). We use panel data from the annual financial statements (balance sheet 
and profit and loss statements) of private Polish companies (limited liability 
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companies and joint stock companies) for up to 12 years of data (2003-2014). The 
Bisnode database contains data retrieved from the National Court Register in 
Poland.  
 
The amount of loans provided by non-financial companies in Poland is huge. For 
instance, KGHM Polska Miedź SA provided loans of 4.245 billion PLN in 2015. 
Intercorporate lending practices are driven, to a greater extent, by related party 
linkages when we consider the average receivables of loans given. However, more 
private lenders give short-term loans to unrelated companies. In the case of long-
term loans for unrelated companies, the number of private lenders is slightly lower 
than lenders on the internal capital market created by business groups (data not 
reported in the table, available on request). 
 
Table 1. Distribution of lenders by industry in the research sample 
PKD code Industry Obs. share (%) 
10-39 Manufacturing 9,157 41% 
49-53 Transportation 1,492 7% 
55-56 Hotels and restaurants 757 3% 
58-63 Information & communication 2,039 9% 
68 Real estate 3,822 17% 
69-75 Professional, scientific & technical services 3,896 17% 
77-82&95 Administrative services 1,272 6% 
  22,435 100% 
Note: Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample firms over industry categories. The 
industry categories are based on two-digit PKD codes. (Polish Standard Industrial 
Classification is based on the EU recommended standard). 
 
Table 1 displays the distribution of lenders by industry in the research sample. In the 
Table we notice an industry “effect” in manufacturing (41%), real estate (17%) and 
the professional, scientific and technical services industry (17%). These three groups 
constitute 75% of the total number of observations. Head offices are expected to 
provide loans to their affiliates inside a business group whereas other companies 
could use lending money as a tool similar to the issuing of trade credit. This industry 
effect indicates that such lending activity is more common among manufacturers 
(10-39 PKD code) and service industries (together 68 and 69-75 PKD codes), which, 
notably, differ in financial flexibility (crucial for investment activity) and their 
source of excess liquidity (cash flow from operations as a basis to build cash 
holdings). Further, the variability of cash flow from operations is lower in the 
service industry with long-term contracts, while debt capacity (availability of 
collateral; creditworthiness) is higher in manufacturing industry. Moreover, the 
capital intensity of operating activity and financial constraints for industry could be 
important incentives for providing loans to other firms. Companies that operate in 
more capital-intensive industries can lend more money thanks to their access to bank 
loans, while service industry firms can provide loans thanks to their high cash flow 
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from operations and cash holdings. This documented industry effect relates to 
hypothesis H3 that treats cash holdings and the availability of bank loans as a basis 
for the redistribution effect. 
 
4. Research Design 
 
We apply the vector-autoregression (VAR) panel model for microeconomic data. 
VAR models often serve as a tool for providing policy implications, forecasts of 
particular economic variables or, simply, as a method for analyzing inter-
dependencies between multiple time series (Lütkepohl, 2005). In VAR, all variables 
are treated as endogenous. This is the main advantage over SEMs, where the 
difficulty of the appropriate application of exogenous variables was widely criticized 
(Sims, 1980; Lucas, 1976). In the case of using a pVAR (panel VAR) methodology, 
Vector Autoregression is used for capturing inter-dependencies among panel data, 
within the same timeframe. Such an approach is applicable for the analysis of some 
phenomenon without making strong preliminary assumptions about its 
characteristics, contrary to the panel approach (GMM system). Therefore, pVAR 
allows for the unobserved heterogeneity of individual panel units (Love and 
Zicchino, 2006; Ugurlu et al., 2014). 
 
The results from the VAR model are mainly interpreted based on Impulse Response 
Functions (IRFs) and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). The impulse 
response function is a dynamic reaction of the ith endogenous variable in the VAR 
model to a shock in the jth error term from the previous period, with all other 
variables held constant. FEVD analysis presents the share of influence of each 
particular variable (in %) in the variance decomposition of each variable. 
 
Sims (1980) explains Structural Vector Autoregression Models (SVAR), where 
variables are structured from the most exogenous to the most endogenous. Variables 
are structured based on Cholesky’s decomposition, in accordance with economic 
interpretation and the results from the Granger causality test (Granger 1969). This 
methodology was applied by Pardo Martínez, Cotte Poveda, and Ronderos (2019) 
and Thalassinos and Politis (2012). 
 
In our model, the following order is assumed:  
sources of financing → provided loans → investment → tax avoidance 
 
Sources of financing include: short-term and long-term bank loans, cash flow from 
operations, and cash holdings. Regarding provided loans, those granted outside and 
within the business group are treated separately. Investment covers capex and capital 
engagement (investment in shares of other companies), while tax avoidance is 
defined as the approximate difference between the nominal and effective tax rates. 
The analyzed autoregression model has the following form: 
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(1) 
 
where:  
 
Y – vector of endogenous variables, α, β – matrices of coefficients to be estimated, Z 
– vector of control variables, fi  – panel-specific fixed effects, dt – binary variables 
representing specific time periods, ε – vector of idiosyncratic, serially uncorrelated 
error terms, i – firm index, t – time index.  
 
For the analysis of the redistribution effect the following variables are used:  
 
st_bank_loans – short-term liabilities on account of bank loans and borrowings/ 
assets; 
ltbank loan – long-term liabilities on account of bank loans and borrowings / assets; 
cashflow – cash flows from operations / assets; 
cash holdings – cash and cash equivalents / assets; 
loan_other – receivables on account of long- and short-term loans granted to other 
entities (outside the business group) / assets; 
loan_bg – receivables on account of long- and short-term loans granted to related 
entities (within the business group) / assets; 
capex – capital expenditures (measured by investment in fixed assets on the basis of 
data from balance sheet) / assets;  
equity_inv – investment in shares of related entities (within the business group) / 
assets; 
equity_other – investment in shares of other entities (outside the business 
group)/assets;  
tax_spread – tax avoidance, i.e. the difference between the nominal and effective tax 
rates (which equals tax income / gross profit). 
 
Based on the modified information criteria (MBIC, MAIC, MQIC) for the panel 
vector autoregression models, the model with one lag on exogenous variables is 
chosen. Before conducting in-depth analysis of impulse response functions (IRFs) 
and forecast error variance decomposition, it is necessary to check whether the VAR 
model is stable. IRFs and forecast error variance decomposition are only 
interpretable if a VAR is invertible and has an infinite-order vector moving average 
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representation. Figure 1 presents the results of the stability test. This indicates that 
the model is stable, as all eigen values of the companion matrix range between -1 
and 1 lie inside the unit circle. This implies that the endogenous variables are 
stationary, and all shocks converge exponentially to zero. 
  
Figure 1. Eigen values of companion matrix 
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Eigen values                
Real Imaginary  Modulus 
0.6078 0.0000 0.6078 
0.6000 0.0000 0.6000 
0.3515 -0.1184 0.3709 
0.3515 0.1184 0.3709 
0.3259 0.0000 0.3259 
0.2701 -0.0554 0.2757 
0.2701 0.0554 0.2757 
0.2265 0.0000 0.2265 
0.1271 0.0000 0.1271 
0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 
Source: Authors' estimates in STATA ver. 15. 
 
The estimates of orthogonalized and accumulated IRFs, with a 95% confidence 
interval, for loans provided within and outside the business group (to other firms, not 
related in terms of capital) are presented in Figures 2-5.  
 
5. Results 
 
The results of estimating the panel VAR are presented in Table 2. Specifically, 
Column (1) presents the outcomes of the GMM estimating the equation with 
intercorporate lending outside the business group; Column (2) with intercorporate 
lending inside the business group; Column (3) with capital expenditures; Column (4) 
with equity engagement inside the business group; Column (5) with equity 
engagement outside the business group as the dependent variable. In this table we 
see for model 3 (with capex as the dependent variable) that firms which provide 
loans to other companies, outside the business group, tend to have lower capital 
expenditures. This finding confirms the hypothesis H1, in which the provision of 
loans outside, as well as within, the business group impacts capital expenditures 
negatively. It may be assumed that it is caused by a shortage of free cash flows that 
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were used for the provision of loans by lenders. A similar effect is identified in the 
case of equity investment within and outside the business group, where the 
relationships with the dependent variable (capex) are also negative. This provides 
evidence of a trade-off between the different types of investments. Moreover, 
enterprises with lower tax avoidance (tax_spread) have higher capital expenditures. 
This results from the postponing of a period of treating the capex as tax-deductible 
costs in accordance with a depreciation schedule of fixed assets contrary to other 
non-investment expenditures. 
 
Table 2. Coefficients estimated with pVAR model for provision of loans inside and 
outside the business group, and its impact on capex and equity investment in other 
firms 
Variable loan_other loan_bg   capex   equity_inv equity_other 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
st_bank_loans 0.1373 *** 0.0765 * -0.0410  -0.0641 *** -0.0093  
L1. (0.0413)  (0.0464)  (0.0526)  (0.0207)  (0.0078)  
ltbankloan 0.0662 * 0.0347  0.2504 *** 0.0004  -0.0089  
L1. (0.0346)  (0.0493)  (0.0702)  (0.0247)  (0.0136)  
cashflow -0.0129 *** 0.0091  0.0502 *** 0.0055 ** -0.0026 * 
L1. (0.0045)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0023)  (0.0016)  
cash holdings 0.1597 * 0.1506 *** -0.3587 *** -0.0245  -0.0101  
L1. (0.0352)  (0.0413)  (0.0371)  (0.0161)  (0.0078)  
loan_other 0.3994 *** 0.0515  -0.3737 *** -0.0608 *** -0.0141 ## 
L1. (0.0722)  (0.0603)  (0.0488)  (0.0222)  (0.0090)  
loan_bg 0.0579  0.4435 *** -0.4241 *** -0.0177  -0.0074  
L1. (0.0437)  (0.0647)  (0.0536)  (0.0281)  (0.0073)  
capex 0.0423 ** 0.1082 *** 0.1852 *** -0.0114  -0.0031  
L1. (0.0141)  (0.0227)  (0.0286)  (0.0079)  (0.0034)  
equity_inv -0.1212 ** -0.1974 *** -0.5892 *** 0.6157 *** -0.0079  
L1. (0.0407)  (0.0657)  (0.0775)  (0.0589)  (0.0165)  
equity_oth -0.0645  -0.0665 *** -0.4913 *** 0.1967 *** 0.3078 *** 
L1. (0.0502)  (0.0778)  (0.0685)  (0.0692)  (0.0895)  
tax_spread 0.0957 ** 0.2195 *** -0.2195 *** -0.0048  0.0029  
L1. (0.0328)   (0.0480)   (0.0667)   (0.0251)   (0.0101)   
long_debt_ 
related 
-0.0378  0.1151  0.0750  0.2181 *** 0.0373 ** 
(0.0649)  (0.0983)  (0.1713)  (0.0597)  (0.0152)  
short_debt_ 
related 
-0.0985 * 0.0627  -0.0442  0.1072 ** 0.0135  
(0.0523)  (0.0892)  (0.1175)  (0.0491)  (0.0133)  
trade_z_bg -0.2633 *** -0.2883 * -0.1251  0.0864 ** -0.0112  
 (0.0791)  (0.1515)  (0.1150)  (0.0417)  (0.0114)  
trade_n_bg -0.3501 *** -0.2624 ** 0.1446  0.0108  -0.0181  
 (0.0925)  (0.1323)  (0.1165)  (0.0571)  (0.0125)  
trade_n_other -0.0017  -0.1109 ** -0.0060  -0.0615 *** -0.0117  
 (0.0327)  (0.0447)  (0.0477)  (0.0176)  (0.0071)  
trade_z_other 0.0619 * 0.0536  -0.2829 *** -0.0016  -0.0128  
 (0.0376)  (0.0490)  (0.0598)  (0.0195)  (0.0094)  
dividends 0.0348  0.0799  0.3318 * -0.1018  -0.0096  
 (0.0728)  (0.1169)  (0.2007)  (0.0775)  (0.0347)  
roa 0.0377 ** 0.0664 *** -0.1241 *** -0.0171 ** -0.0048  
 (0.0153)  (0.0222)  (0.0242)  (0.0080)  (0.0029)  
size_b 0.0000 *** 0.0000 * 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   
N 7,163     GMM Criterion  Q(b)  0.0539  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
## p < 0.15, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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The results of estimating model 4 (with equity_inv as the dependent variable) and 
model 5 (with equity_other as the dependent variable) confirm hypothesis H2, in 
which the provision of loans to other companies (outside the business group) is 
negatively correlated with capital engagement in the shares of other firms. In other 
words, our results confirm the existence of a substitution effect between financing 
the company with loans (e.g. from shareholders) and the injection of capital through 
contributions covering the share capital or as equity infusion. This may be caused by 
the possibility of obtaining the interest from loans regardless of the borrower’s 
financial situation and regardless of any resolution of a shareholders’ meeting 
concerning dividend payments. The additional incentive to provide loans instead of 
infusing equity is that, in the case of company insolvency and the need for redress, 
loans are on a higher position than equity contributions in the liabilities’ hierarchy. 
Such a relationship was not identified for the provision of loans within a business 
group. The substitution effect between equity contributions (capital engagement) and 
loans may be caused by limitations on classifying interest on loans as tax deductible 
costs for lenders with at least a 25% share in the equity, as introduced with the rules 
on thin capitalization in the Corporate Income Tax Act.  
 
 Shareholders may prefer to consider loans as a form of capital injection into the 
company, due to the possibility of obtaining the interest even in the case of a 
borrower’s deteriorating financial condition. A contrary situation occurs in the case 
of capital contributions, as dividend payments are dependent on resolutions on profit 
distribution. The significant impact of tax matters is confirmed by the results of this 
research, i.e. that enterprises which avoid taxes (have a higher difference between 
the nominal and effective tax rates (tax_spread)), tend to provide a higher amount of 
loans within and outside the business group. 
 
Based on the results of models 1 and 2 and the analysis of IRFs, non-financial firms 
provide loans outside the business group through the redistribution of their cash 
holdings generated from operating activity (cash flow), cash holdings and long-term 
bank loans. This evidence confirms hypothesis H3. Loans for unrelated firms are 
provided by viable companies with low equity investment in other firms inside their 
business groups and are financed by bank debt and trade credit outside the business 
group. The results of the estimation of the impact of loans provided within and 
outside the business group on capital expenditures and capital engagement in shares 
of other firms, using the pVAR approach, indicates that there are grounds to believe 
in a redistribution effect, in accordance with hypothesis H3. 
 
A Granger causality test for the mechanism of providing loans by non-financial 
enterprises is presented in Table 3. The null hypothesis that bank loans, cash 
holdings, cash flow from operations, and tax avoidance do not Granger cause the 
provision of loans to firms outside the business group is rejected. In fact, short-term 
bank loans and overall cash holdings Granger cause the provision of loans within the 
business group. 
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Table 3. Granger causality test 
 
st_bank 
_loans 
ltbank 
loan 
cash 
flow  
cash 
holdings 
loan_ 
other 
loan_ 
bg 
capex 
  
equity_ 
inv 
equity_ 
other 
tax_ 
spread 
st_ban
k_loan 
- 1.37 0.482 5.645** 3.056 0.047 0.154 1.036 2.865 1.209 
 (0.242) (0.488) (0.018) (0.080) (0.829) (0.695) (0.309) (0.091) (0.272) 
ltbank 
loan 
9.518*** - 1.074 2.681 1.101 6.055** 3.76* 1.474 3.325* 5.867** 
(0.002)  (0.300) (0.102) (0.294) (0.014) (0.052) (0.225) (0.068) (0.015) 
cash 
flow 
34.352 4.722 - 21.709 12.729 10.809 0 2.178 7.081 38.927 
<0.000) (0.030)  <0.000) <0.000) (0.001) (0.995) (0.140) (0.008) <0.000) 
cash 
holdin 
0.046 0.7 0.07 - 0.006 4.003** 27.22*** 2.044 0.269 3.553* 
(0.830) (0.403) (0.791)  (0.940) (0.045) <0.000) (0.153) (0.604) (0.059) 
loan_ 
other 
11.04*** 3.658* 8.16*** 20.59*** - 1.758 8.98*** 8.87*** 1.649 8.50*** 
(0.001) (0.056) (0.004) <0.000)  (0.185) (0.003) (0.003) (0.199) (0.004) 
loan_ 
bg 
2.715* 0.494 1.265 13.30*** 0.729 - 22.81*** 9.04*** 0.731 20.9*** 
(0.099) (0.482) (0.261) <0.000) (0.393)  <0.000) (0.003) (0.392) <0.000) 
capex  
0.608 12.74*** 38.15*** 93.5*** 58.57*** 62.5*** - 57.87*** 51.4*** 10.8*** 
(0.435) <0.000) <0.000) <0.000) <0.000) <0.000)  <0.000) <0.000) (0.001) 
equity
_inv 
9.59*** 0 5.58** 2.32 7.531*** 0.396 2.081 - 8.086*** 0.037 
(0.002) (0.989) (0.018) (0.128) (0.006) (0.529) (0.149)  (0.004) (0.848) 
equity
_oth 
1.423 0.422 2.767* 1.654 2.461 1.037 0.813 0.232 - 0.081 
(0.233) (0.516) (0.096) (0.198) (0.117) (0.309) (0.367) (0.630)  (0.776) 
tax_ 
spread 
0.608 1.759 0.881 0.72 1.768 0.592 0.482 0.144 0.67 - 
(0.435) (0.185) (0.348) (0.396) (0.184) (0.442) (0.487) (0.705) (0.413)  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
The response functions of the provision of loans to the impulse in sources of 
financing indicate that, in the short-term, non-financial enterprises provide larger 
loans to firms outside the business group, as a response to taking out short- or long-
term bank loans or having accumulated cash holdings. The strongest accumulated 
response of the provision of loans (outside the business group) can be observed in 
the impulse for bank loans, while loans provided within the business group tend to 
be more sensitive to short-term bank loans and cash holdings.  
 
Based on the results from the Granger test, the null hypothesis that the provision of 
loans to firms outside and within the business group does not Granger cause lower 
capital expenditures is rejected; thus, we fail to reject hypothesis H1. Therefore, the 
provision of loans by non-financial companies decreases their capital expenditures 
(capex). There is not enough evidence to reject hypothesis H2, in the case of the 
provision of loans to enterprises outside the business group. This indicates that the 
provision of loans to companies outside the business group has a negative impact on 
capital engagement in related entities.  
 
 The orthogonalized and accumulated impulse response functions of capital 
expenditures and investment in the shares of companies outside and within the 
business group (capital engagement) confirm that the provision of loans, either 
external or internal, is negatively associated with both capital expenditures and the 
capital engagement of shareholders. The highest decrease in capex can be observed 
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as a reaction to shock in the provision of loans to firms within the business group by 
private companies, who have more limited access to finance (e.g. from banks) than 
transparent public companies listed on the stock exchange. 
 
Tax avoidance Granger causes taking out bank loans thanks to leverage and interest 
tax shield effects. Moreover, tax avoidance Granger causes capital expenditure. This 
is in line with the economic interpretation, as depreciation of tangible assets enables 
using a non-interest tax shield. The results of the Granger tests imply that tax 
avoidance is causing the provision of loans outside and within the business group. 
Thus, it may be assumed that there exists a mechanism whereby limited liability 
companies act as intermediaries in the process of providing loans, to avoid 
restrictions in qualifying paid or capitalized interest as a tax-deductible cost.   
 
According to the Granger causality test statistics, there is a bidirectional dependency 
between loans provided to companies outside the business group and both capital 
expenditures, as well as capital engagement, in related companies. Especially, 
capital engagement in related enterprises causes the provision of loans outside the 
business group. This leads to the conclusion that private companies (not listed on the 
stock exchange) are acting as intermediaries in the process of financing other 
companies to avoid restrictions regarding the deductibility of interest costs in the 
context of thin capitalization. On the other hand, the provision of loans outside the 
business group does not Granger cause acquiring internal sources of financing from 
cash flow, cash holdings or bank loans. It may indicate a distinct character of loans 
provided outside the business group and loans within relationships in the internal 
capital market of the business group. This leads to the conclusion that limited 
liability companies are used as intermediaries for providing loans outside the 
business group by their partners (suppliers of trade credit) or their owners 
(individuals among the shareholders). 
 
For internal loans provision inside the business group, there is not enough evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis of the Granger test for short-term bank loans and cash 
flow from operations. However, there is evidence that the provision of internal loans 
Granger causes long-term bank loans and the accumulation of cash holdings. This 
indicates that there is a foundation for creating an internal capital market within the 
business group in the form of access to long-term financing from the bank and cash 
holdings by the business group.  
 
 Based on the stability test, all eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle; therefore, the 
VAR model is stable. Based on forecast error variance decomposition, the impact of 
shocks explaining the causes for the provision of loans to companies outside the 
business group can be observed. Table 4 presents a fraction of the forecast error 
variance decomposition for each variable in the model that can be assigned to 
orthogonalized shock in that variable, as well as other endogenous variables. 
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Table 4. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (changes of the variable in rows 
explained by shocks to variables in columns) 
                 Forecast horizon   Impulse variable                  
Variable 
st_bank
_loans 
ltbank 
loan 
cash 
flow 
cash 
holding 
loan_ 
other 
loan_ 
bg 
capex 
 
equity_ 
inv 
equity_ 
oth 
tax_ 
spread 
st_bankloans 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.9905 0.0036 0.0004 0.0004 0.0030 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 
3 0.9856 0.0060 0.0005 0.0004 0.0044 0.0000 0.0002 0.0012 0.0010 0.0007 
4 0.9839 0.0070 0.0005 0.0005 0.0048 0.0001 0.0002 0.0014 0.0010 0.0007 
5 0.9833 0.0073 0.0006 0.0005 0.0049 0.0001 0.0002 0.0014 0.0010 0.0007 
ltbankloan       
1 0.0818 0.9182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.0646 0.9239 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0055 0.0010 0.0007 0.0015 0.0021 
3 0.0601 0.9186 0.0009 0.0004 0.0010 0.0119 0.0010 0.0015 0.0023 0.0024 
4 0.0586 0.9133 0.0010 0.0006 0.0019 0.0161 0.0010 0.0024 0.0027 0.0024 
5 0.0581 0.9097 0.0011 0.0007 0.0025 0.0182 0.0010 0.0034 0.0030 0.0024 
cashflow         
1 0.0698 0.0022 0.9280 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.1403 0.0084 0.8078 0.0024 0.0045 0.0117 0.0000 0.0018 0.0025 0.0206 
3 0.1429 0.0117 0.7948 0.0028 0.0073 0.0151 0.0001 0.0019 0.0028 0.0207 
4 0.1425 0.0126 0.7922 0.0029 0.0081 0.0161 0.0001 0.0019 0.0028 0.0207 
5 0.1424 0.0128 0.7914 0.0029 0.0084 0.0164 0.0001 0.0021 0.0028 0.0207 
cashholdings  
1 0.0000 0.0011 0.0131 0.9858 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.0002 0.0012 0.0132 0.9676 0.0008 0.0053 0.0091 0.0012 0.0000 0.0014 
3 0.0002 0.0018 0.0131 0.9609 0.0009 0.0059 0.0110 0.0043 0.0004 0.0015 
4 0.0003 0.0022 0.0131 0.9580 0.0009 0.0059 0.0113 0.0062 0.0006 0.0015 
5 0.0003 0.0024 0.0131 0.9569 0.0010 0.0059 0.0113 0.0070 0.0007 0.0015 
loan_other      
1 0.0036 0.0012 0.0033 0.2161 0.7759 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.0104 0.0035 0.0029 0.1897 0.7780 0.0049 0.0031 0.0044 0.0004 0.0027 
3 0.0134 0.0063 0.0028 0.1833 0.7679 0.0067 0.0043 0.0108 0.0010 0.0035 
4 0.0146 0.0082 0.0028 0.1810 0.7614 0.0071 0.0047 0.0151 0.0014 0.0037 
5 0.0151 0.0091 0.0028 0.1801 0.7583 0.0073 0.0048 0.0172 0.0016 0.0037 
loan_bg           
1 0.0001 0.0016 0.0034 0.0307 0.1757 0.7885 0 0 0 0 
2 0.0021 0.0013 0.0049 0.0261 0.1491 0.7714 0.0182 0.0123 0.0004 0.0142 
3 0.0043 0.0028 0.0048 0.0251 0.1398 0.7453 0.0246 0.0330 0.0021 0.0180 
4 0.0057 0.0048 0.0047 0.0245 0.1361 0.7290 0.0262 0.0470 0.0035 0.0185 
5 0.0064 0.0061 0.0047 0.0242 0.1346 0.7211 0.0265 0.0538 0.0042 0.0184 
capex               
1 0.0041 0.0041 0.0195 0.0020 0.0005 0.0007 0.9691 0 0 0 
2 0.0051 0.0184 0.0166 0.0044 0.0055 0.0318 0.8460 0.0529 0.0115 0.0078 
3 0.0048 0.0244 0.0172 0.0053 0.0061 0.0438 0.8042 0.0681 0.0153 0.0110 
4 0.0048 0.0255 0.0175 0.0054 0.0061 0.0463 0.7961 0.0703 0.0159 0.0121 
5 0.0048 0.0257 0.0175 0.0055 0.0060 0.0467 0.7949 0.0705 0.0160 0.0124 
equity_inv      
1 0.0026 0.0006 0.0009 0.0049 0.0218 0.0791 0.0102 0.8800 0 0 
2 0.0086 0.0005 0.0012 0.0043 0.0348 0.0846 0.0123 0.8475 0.0062 0.0000 
3 0.0120 0.0007 0.0012 0.0041 0.0416 0.0872 0.0136 0.8287 0.0108 0.0000 
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4 0.0140 0.0010 0.0012 0.0040 0.0447 0.0881 0.0142 0.8194 0.0133 0.0001 
5 0.0150 0.0014 0.0012 0.0040 0.0460 0.0883 0.0146 0.8150 0.0146 0.0001 
equity_oth      
1 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0022 0.0016 0.0000 0.0523 0.9422 0 
2 0.0016 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 0.0035 0.0020 0.0002 0.0542 0.9370 0.0000 
3 0.0021 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0038 0.0021 0.0002 0.0543 0.9356 0.0000 
4 0.0022 0.0009 0.0005 0.0007 0.0039 0.0021 0.0002 0.0543 0.9351 0.0001 
5 0.0023 0.0010 0.0005 0.0007 0.0039 0.0021 0.0003 0.0543 0.9350 0.0001 
tax_spread       
1 0.0022 0.0002 0.0054 0.0001 0.0004 0.0042 0.0050 0.0000 0.0000 0.9826 
2 0.0021 0.0019 0.0054 0.0001 0.0007 0.0039 0.0047 0.0003 0.0002 0.9807 
3 0.0021 0.0029 0.0054 0.0001 0.0010 0.0042 0.0047 0.0004 0.0002 0.9791 
4 0.0021 0.0032 0.0054 0.0001 0.0011 0.0044 0.0047 0.0004 0.0002 0.9785 
5 0.0021 0.0033 0.0054 0.0001 0.0011 0.0045 0.0047 0.0004 0.0002 0.9783 
Std. errors for FEVD and confidence intervals based on 200 Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
While the time horizon for the forecast is ten steps, for brevity, Table 4 presents the 
first five steps. The order of variables in vector autoregression models with 
Cholesky’s decomposition, assumes that loans provided outside the business group 
do not directly impact sources of financing, while impacting them only in the future. 
It is assumed that taken out bank loans, internal funds generated from operating 
activities (cash flow) and cash holdings impact loans provided outside and within 
the business group, which then translates into an effect on capital expenditures 
(capex) and capital engagement in other firms (investment in shares of other 
companies). Based on the results presented in Table 4, it may be observed that most 
of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) is due to own innovations in 
variables. Around 14% of cash flow changes may be assigned to shocks in bank 
loans (mainly short-term), and only 1.3% of changes in cash holdings of private 
enterprises which provide loans may be assigned to shocks in cash flow.  
 
Private non-financial enterprises use their cash holdings for the provision of loans. 
This is confirmed by FEVD, as the provision of loans outside the business group is 
explained by 18-21.6% of the changes in cash holdings, and not more than 1.5% by 
changes in bank loans (2.4% when we consider together short-term and long-term 
bank loans). The FEVD of loans provided within the business group is explained by 
shocks in cash holdings of only 2.4-3%. No more than 5.4% of the changes in loans 
provided within the business group are explained by capital engagement in related 
entities, while 13.5-17.6% of those changes are due to loans provided outside the 
business group, and 1.4-1.8% by tax avoidance. The share of the FEVD of capital 
engagement within the business group to shocks to itself ranges between 81% and 
88%. The total impact of shocks in the provision of loans to changes in internal 
capital engagement ranges from 10 to 13%. The response functions of the provision 
of loans outside the business group to shocks in sources of financing indicate a 
short-term effect, which eventually fades out in the mid- and long-term. As a result 
of cash holdings accumulation, enterprises provide higher loans outside the business 
group, while in the mid-term, the effect fades out and in the long-term, it disappears. 
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In the case of loans outside the business group financed by cash holdings, the 
reaction of loans increases only 2-3 periods after the shock in cash holdings occurs.   
 
The results also indicate a trade-off between capital expenditures or investment in 
shares in other firms and the provision of loans to other firms, in accordance with 
hypotheses H1 and H2.  
 
Figure 2. Orthogonalized and accumulated Impulse Response Functions of loans 
provided outside the business group to shocks in internal and external financing 
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Figure 3. Orthogonalized and accumulated Impulse Response Functions of loans 
provided inside the business group to shock in cash holdings, cash flow and bank 
loans 
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Figure 4. Orthogonalized and accumulated Impulse Response Functions of capex 
and shares of other companies to shocks in loans provided outside the business 
group 
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Figure 5. Orthogonalized and accumulated Impulse Response Functions of capex 
and shares of other companies to loans provided inside the business group 
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 This finding again confirms the presence of a redistribution effect of accumulated 
cash holdings through the provision of loans to enterprises which face higher 
limitations in access to external finance, e.g. from the bank. There is, therefore, no 
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basis to reject hypothesis H3. The response of loans provided outside the business 
group to shocks in bank loans is positive and decreases in the mid-term and fades 
out in the long-term. This indicates that there is also a redistribution effect of funds 
obtained from bank loans for companies which face limitations in access to finance 
through loans provided outside the business group. However, in the case of loans 
provided inside the business group, the accumulated response functions imply the 
negative effect of the impulse in bank loans (Figure 3). This may result from the 
usage of a surplus in cash holdings for the purpose of paying the bank loan instead 
of providing loans. On the other hand, it may also reflect the effectiveness of an 
internal capital market which provides financing to related entities, instead of taking 
out bank loans, which are more expensive. It is important to note that the large scale 
of loans provided outside the banking system may lead to a significant increase in 
the risk of a firm’s insolvency. Although the provision of loans may be seen as a 
remedy for a company’s (borrower’s) insolvency and loss of debt service capacity, 
the potential further bankruptcy of the borrower may transfer the risk of insolvency 
to lenders indebted to banks. This may introduce higher risk into the bank loans 
market. 
 
The response of loans provided outside the business group to shocks in cash flow 
from operations is negative in the first period, then converges back to zero in 
subsequent periods (Figure 2). This may be a consequence of the provision of loans 
to companies with a lower capacity for current debt service. This would indicate that 
the provision of loans outside the business group is motivated by trade relations, 
especially in terms of maintaining liquidity, the realization of investment or the 
deferral of the announcement of the insolvency of a key supplier or recipient 
(customer).  
 
According to the shape of the orthogonalized response function of loan provision in 
the internal capital market (of the business group) to shocks in cash flow, increase of 
cash flow implies an increase in loans provided within the business group (opposite 
to loans granted outside the business group). In the short-term, loans provided 
internally increase as a response to the increase of cash flow. The accumulated effect 
is smaller in the mid-term and fades out after five periods. In contrast, in the case of 
loans provided outside the business group, as cash flow increases, the 
orthogonalized IRF decreases strongly in the short term and then returns almost to 
the starting point and fades out in the mid-term, being still below zero. And finally, 
the accumulated response functions indicate a decrease of those loans in the short-
term with the effect fading out in the mid-term. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Our research findings contribute to the existing body of knowledge of the 
redistribution effect that is described so far in the literature in connection with the 
trade credit channel (Meltzer, 1960; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Blasio, 2005; 
Guariglia and Mateut, 2006; Taketa and Udell, 2007; Cull and Morduch, 2007; Love 
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et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2011). We extend this concept of trade credit (simply 
postponing repayment) into providing loans to other companies with the use of the 
real transfer of money. Confirmation of the existence of this redistribution effect 
outside the business groups, also lets us contribute to the literature on the internal 
capital market (so far understood as created inside the business group) and to the 
wide literature on cash holdings and financial flexibility by highlighting the crucial 
role of hoarding cash in solving the problems of SMEs limited access to finance and 
small firms’ financial constraints. Our study contributes to the literature by 
differentiating the mechanism of private enterprises’ intercorporate lending inside 
and outside their business group, the finance sources of intra-group and inter-
corporate loans and the reaction of capex and capital engagement in other firms to 
shocks in the provision of loans. We diagnose the effects of intercorporate lending 
outside the business group.  
 
The main limitation of our study is its focus on a single country analysis. So far 
there is only very limited research on this phenomenon of intercorporate lending, in 
China, India, Chile, Germany and Poland. Because the SAFE (2013; 2016) survey 
confirms the significant role of non-bank borrowings in most European countries, 
there is still a substantial opportunity to increase knowledge and to contribute to the 
literature. 
 
 Moreover, the financing advantage hypothesis analyzed by Buchuk et al. (2014) 
suggests that internal debt (including loan provisions by shareholders) gives the 
advantage to the lending firm. If the controlling shareholder decides to provide 
equity financing directly, they can only contribute with their share of dividends from 
the firm with excess cash income. In this regard, internal debt (due to intra-group 
loans) gives the advantage of indirect equity financing as interest income is not 
restricted to profit generated by the borrower. On the contrary, inter-corporate loans 
granted to non-related firms (or partnerships, unincorporated businesses) play 
mainly an emergency financing role and defer bankruptcy. Market frictions, such as 
asymmetric information and agency problems, leave firms without financing which 
limits their investment and growth. Our results confirm that non-financial 
enterprises' provision of loans reduces their capital expenditures, as a result of the 
absence of the free cash flows that were already used for loan provision. Providing 
loans by shareholders substitutes for capital engagement in the financing of an 
enterprise. 
 
However, it is important to note that emergency borrowings from other companies 
(instead of banks), used for deferring a default, could introduce a credit risk into the 
business sector, resulting not only in underinvestment but also in liquidity problems 
and an increase in financial constraints. The redistribution effect of cash holdings 
and money borrowed from banks by companies with creditworthiness to unrelated 
companies (with financial constraints and lacking creditworthiness) is dangerous for 
the stability of the financial system, because of the default risk of these “indirect 
borrowers” and their inability to repay loans.  
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